The paper introduces the mechanism of the Flow-based Capacity Allocation (FBA) 
Introduction
In the electricity market, beside the power exchange, transmission capacities are also traded. Transmission capacities mean the right to transmit a certain value of power in a given time period from a given source to a given sink of the electricity network. The original owners of capacities are the Transmission System Operators (TSOs). They can sell them to the users of the network (whole sale traders, retailers etc). There are several ways of capacity allocation: bilateral contracts, OTC markets, auctions etc.
In the following, a coordinated auction model is analysed, which is intended to be introduced to the CEE electricity market: the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) region consists of Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Only the so-called cross-border transmission capacities are considered, those are transmission rights between the areas of two different TSOs. Remark that, in the CEE, an area of a TSO (or association of TSOs) typically means an area of a country (countries).
According to the European Community Regulations 1228/2003/EC and 714/2009/EC, a market-based mechanism has to be adopted to allocate the capacities. It has the following requirements:
• prevention of overloading, • efficient deals with interdependent physical flows, • avoidance of discrimination in allocating electricity transmission capacities. Hence, instead of the former OTC bilateral contracts, CEE TSOs intend to introduce stepwise a coordinated flow-based allocation of cross-border electricity transmission capacities at interconnections between CEE TSOs. The steps are (a) Coordinated Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) assessment method. It is an explicit coordinated auction, however, only the available cross-border capacities are taken into account. This model is applied now. (b) Coordinated flow-based allocation (FBA) method. It is planned to be introduced soon. This model takes the properties of the whole electricity network into account.
There is a wide range of literature on congestion management methods as well as on their proposals for the European market. Regulation 1228/2003 is analysed by Boucher and Smeers (2002) and Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) . The investigated FBA method is based on zonal pricing: the properties of nodal, uniform or zonal pricing are discussed in Ding and Fuller (2005) . Within the sectors uniform pricing is applied, however, e.g., the model of nodal pricing can be found in Stigler, Heinz, Todem and Christian (2005) (as regards Austria) and in Leuthold, Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008) (as regards Germany). The publications, proposals of ETSO-E (2012) should also be taken into account.
The approach of our paper is different to the above. While most literature analysed the methods theoretically, our discussion is based on practice:
• instead of theoretical systems, the auction rules published by CAO (2011) are analysed and • the FBA model has also been implemented and used in energy-trading Informatics Platforms of Systems Ltd. On one hand, we would like to share the experiences of the implementation and tests of the method: focusing on multiple optima and sensitivity analysis. On the other hand, we would like to demonstrate an alternative auction model, which also fulfills the requirement of the European Community Regulations 1228/2003/EC and 714/2009/EC, however, the total income of the TSOs are greater than the FBA method.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the FBA method is introduced. In Section 3 the cases of multiple optima and a particular sensitivity analysis are discussed. In Section 4 a global optimization problemis introduced in order to maximize the total income of the TSOs. Here some comparisons with the results of original FBA auction are presented. Section 5 concludes the paper. Finally, all notations and abbreviations are explained in the Nomenclature at the end of the paper.
Mechanism of the FBA method
The coordinator of the auction is the Central Allocation Office (CAO), which is founded and owned by the TSOs of the CEE region. The detailed rules of the market can be found on the CAO website (CAO 2011). In order to make the paper self-contained, the auction rules are summarized in this section.
There are eight TSOs (APG, CEPS, ELES, TENNET, MAVIR, PSEO, SEPS, a.s. and 50HzT), however, in the market APG, TENNET and 50HzT constitute one zone. Hence, the trade is possible among five zones. Regarding the type of the auctions there are yearly, monthly and daily auctions. In case of daily auction, capacities can be purchased separately for each hour of the day.
As regards the scheduling of the auction: in the first period (called nomination) the market participants submit their bids (extended with a correction cycle), then in the second period the CAO calculates the auction prices, capacity allocations and announces them at a certain cut off time. -(line k ) is the maximum capacity in the opposite direction. The reason of the two different capacities corresponding to the directions is that they are remaining capacities after longterm contracts and previous auctions.
The PTDF and AMF values are published as an Excel file by CAO, prior to the auction. In case of daily auction the values of each hour are on separate sheets. One example is presented on Figure 1 . The columns mean the following:
Critical Branch: a critical segment of the network Case:
'n-0' means the primary physical element, the 'n-1'-type cases are the standby physical elements. The latters are used in case of any failure of the primary element. In the modeling view, each Critical Branch/Case pair means a separate line. Source:
the physical source of the element Sink:
the physical sink of the element The whole sheet has 5 × 4 = 20 PTDF columns corresponding to the Source-Sink Pairs (5 Zones), and it has about 1000 rows (Critical Branch/Case pairs).
PTDF Zone Zone line
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The LP model of the allocation
The allocation method should find the most efficient capacity allocation subject to properties and limits of the transmission network and all bids together.
The auction is modelled by a linear programming (LP) problem, detailed below, where the constraints describe the properties of the network. The objective function is the so-called social welfare function. It represents the efficiency of network usage measured by the financial value of allocated capacities based on the submitted bid prices. Hence, in the FBA auction the welfare of the society (i.e., the utilization of the whole network) is maximized, despite the cases of bilateral contracts and OTC markets where the allocation could be at most Pareto optimal.
Based on the notations in the Nomenclature the model is the following. The social welfare will be maximized: subject to the following constraints.
The network constraints represent the PTDF and AMF structures:
The allocated capacities cannot be negative or greater than the requested capacities:
Auction prices
The solution of the LP problem (2.1)-(2.5) yields the allocation of capacities. However, at the end of the auction uniform auction prices have to be announced to each source-sink zone pair, too. Those can be found in the following way.
The optimal solution of the LP problem also yields Shadow Prices (dual solutions) corresponding to the constraints. E.g., denote the shadow prices of lines. They represent an increase in the value of the objective function connected to the marginal increase of the corresponding AMF. Intuitively: the worth of one unit of capacity of the given direction of the line, regarding the optimal allocation.
The Auction Price of source-sink pair from zone x to zone y is given by the formula:
Intuitively, this means that the auction price is the worth of one unit capacity on the certain source-sink pair: i.e. the sum of the usage percentage of each (directed) line multiplied by the worth of the line.
Then, the capacity allocation based on Auction Prices is the following:
• if the bid price is greater than the auction price, then the whole requested quantity of the capacity is allocated, • if the bid price is less than the auction price, then zero capacity is allocated, • if the bid price equals the auction price, then the requested capacity is partially satisfied until the limits of the network constraints. From the Complementary Slackness Theorem follows that an optimal allocation of the LP problem satisfies the above rules and vice versa.
The Market Spread Auction
The main reason of cross-border transmission is that the price of electricity is cheaper on the market of the source zone than on the market of the sink zone. Assume that the auction participants have some forecast on the zone prices. Let us use are the bid and ask price of one unit electricity at Zone x. Then assume that all bid prices are their reasonable upper limit. The question is that how much capacity is allocated on each sinksource pair. I.e., the following auction is considered: one bid for each source-sink pair is submitted with parameters In practice, the market spread auction is the most common tool to get a first impression on the market before bidding. However, the forecasts of the zone prices have errors. Hence, the sensitivity analysis, which is presented in the following section, is very important.
3 Multiple optima, sensitivity analysis 3.1 Multiple optima The auction rule is well-defined only if it yields unique allocation and auction prices for each bid combination. As regards the allocation the multiple optima of the primal LP problem can be problematic, while the multiple optima of the dual problem can cause indeterminate auction prices. As it will be seen, the primal case is regulated well by the auction rules while in the dual case the multiple optima do not occur in practice.
Alternative optimal allocations
The following phenomena can happen: (a) there are two bids with same Source-Sink Pair and Bid Price and at least one of their requests is just partially satisfied, (b) there is a bid with zero bid price which can be (at least partially) satisfied, (c) there are other types of multiple optimal solutions. Let us consider some examples illustrating the above phenomena. The network is characterized in Table 1 . Table 1 follows the structure of the CAO datasheet (see Figure 1) and it is assumed to be valid for the first hour of the day (H01). In the following, only bids on the MAVIR->PSEO and MAVIR->ELES are considered. Hence only data in bold are important for us.
The examples follow the structure of CAO result sheet. The product 'H01' means that the bids submitted for the first hour of the day. Phenomena a, b, c are illustrated in Tables 2, 3 , 4, respectively.
for all x y Zones , ∈ .
Tab. 1. Characterization of the network. The first two situations are managed by Annex 5 of the Auction Rules of CAO (2011):
• As regards Situation a: The "First-Come-First-Serve Principle." has to be used. I.e., the bid submitted earlier must be preferred.
• Regarding Situation b: the auction rules say "the Bid Price is replaced for optimization algorithm purposes with a very small number not influencing the Auction Price calculation.". I.e., if any unused capacity remains in the network, it must be allocated among the submitted zero-priced bids. Multiple optimal allocations can be arisen only in case of multiple optimal (primal) bases. Hence, alternative allocations can be produced only by the precise setting of the bid prices and/or the PTDF and AMF values. This situation can happen naturally only in case of Phenomena a and b. The problems with Phenomenon c cannot arise spontaneously thanks to the number of rows and the structure of the PTDF matrix. However, those problems can be set artificially, see e.g. Figure 3 . Hence, in practice the Auction Rules exclude the undefined allocations. This was confirmed by the results of CAO FBA Dry Run II (2009).
Alternative auction prices
As regards the auction prices, they can be indefinite in case of multiple optima of the dual of the (auction) LP problem. Beside complex situations, this can arise as in the following simple example.
Example 3.1 The PTDF matrix is defined in Table 5. The submitted bid and results are illustrated in Table 6. The reason of multiple dual optima is that in the LP model the (AMF+) constraint (2.2) of LINE_00001 and the (requested capacity) constraint (2.4) of the bid are fulfilled by equality at the same time. This means that the values of the corresponding (primal) slack variables are zero. Those variables represent the optimality conditions of the dual problem, hence, the only dual basis variable can correspond to the constraint of LINE_00001 or to the bid constraint. This means two optimal dual basesand infinite optimal dual solutions.

Indeed, if we perturb the requested capacities:
• in case of e.g., 59MW requested capacity, exactly the bid constraint will be the basis and the auction price will be zero (the awarded capacity will be 59),
• in case of e.g., 61MW requested capacity, exactly the AMF+ constraint will be the basis and the auction price will be 10 (the awarded capacity will be 60). The Auction Rules do not exclude the multiple dual solutions. However, among the practical tests of CAO FBA Dry Run II (2009) there is no example for alternative auction prices.
Sensitivity analysis of Market Spread Auction
In this section the Market Spread Auction, defined in Section 2.3, is considered. Assume that the bid and ask prices of electricity at a given Zone k change by the same value Δp. Let the Figure 4 , where the intervals are changing at the same points. In order to calculate the endpoints of the sensitivity intervals a special sensitivity analysis should be applied because more than one parameter of the LP is changing. I.e., if the price of Zone k changes by Δp, then the new bid prices will be where x ≠ y, x ≠ k, y ≠ k.
Let us use the compact form of Market Spread Auction problem:
where constraints (3.6) are the network constraints (2.2), (2.3) of the auction LP problem. The bid constraints (2.4) are skipped, because the values of the requested capacities are infinity. Let B be the matrix of optimal basis of the above problem. The vector of changed bid prices can be written into the form:
where Substituting (3.7) the above inequalities can be written as and Hence, the sensitivity interval is Δp  (Δp min , Δp max ) where and Remark, in case of simultaneous changes of the Zone prices the sensitivity analysis can be solved similarly. The difference is that instead of intervals, the sensitivity remains constant if Δp is within a certain polyhedron.
Social welfare and total revenue of the TSOs
In the CAO auction rules the objective function of the LP problem is calculated by the submitted bid prices while the bidders have to pay only the uniform auction prices of the sourcesink pairs. I.e., the objective is to maximize however, the real revenue of CAO (TSOs) is Hence, the income of the TSOs will be usually different to the value of the objective function. In order to illustrate the arising questions consider the PTDF and AMF values of Table 7 . • the objective function of the alternative model is more reasonable.
• Despite the LP problem of CAO, the alternative model is a nonconvex nonlinear programming problem. Let us illustrate the difference between the two models by the following example Example 4.2 Consider the PTDF matrix of The exact formulation of the alternative model is the following. The notions are the same as at the LP problem of Section 2.1 completed by the following type of variables: d r (x, y, b) : the remaining demand that can be satisfied from the residual capacities at the end of the auction. Those variables must equal zero in order to allocate the capacities efficiently.
Hence, the objective function is
where M is a big number. The following constraints are considered. No allocated capacity under the auction price: All requested capacities above the auction price are fully satisfied:
The allocated and free capacities:
Constraints corresponding to the bid properties:
The (nonnegative) variables are:
The nonnegativities of the remaining demands with constraints (4.12) prevent against the overloading.
Problem (4.9) -(4.16) is a nonconvex (quadratically constrained) quadratic programming problem (QP). This type of problems can be solved, e.g., by the method of Audet et al. (2000) . However, possibly a more effective solution method could be found by the exploitation of the special properties of the problem. It is based on the simple fact, that the maximum is attained at auction prices that equal to one of the submitted bid prices. The detailed development of the method is out of the scope of this paper and will be the part of future research. 
, ∈ 0 (4.10) Here, only one illustrative practical example is presented in order to show, that based on the capacity allocation of the original linear programming auction method, higher income can be realized by setting the auction prices independently from the shadowprices of the lines. Example 4.3 presents a practical test problem where still in case of the same capacity allocation, the use of auction prices independent from the shadow prices can result higher income.
Remark that one reason for the use of auction prices based on shadow prices is that shadow prices play an important role in some possible distribution methods of the income, see Leuthod and Todem (2007) . However, the shadow prices are calculated on the base of the submitted prices, and does not reflect the auction prices.
The above experiences have exploited some important properties and drawbacks of the auction method. They can help in thinking over the auction rules as well as in development of bidding strategies.
Conclusion
The paper presents an introduction to the mathematical part of the FBA auction rules with a more detailed discussion than 
